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CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGERS: THE 
IMPORTANCE OF IDEAS AND THE 
BOWELS IN THE COSMOS 
Thomas E. Baker* 
I wonder if cosmically an idea is any more important than 
the bowels. 
Yours ever, 
O.W.H. 1 
Wednesday, June 19, 1918-an otherwise unremarkable day 
in history- was the morning of a chance meeting between Jus-
tice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in the prime of his formidable 
judicial career, and a little-known district judge nearly half his 
age named Learned Hand.2 By coincidence, the two judges 
shared a train ride from New York City to Boston. They had a 
spirited argument about when the majority can silence the 
speech of a minority. Perhaps they were attracted to each other 
because they disagreed so agreeably, each recognizing in the 
other a mind with which to be reckoned. During that conversa-
tion their acquaintanceship began to develop into an intellectual 
friendship that would last the rest of their lives. 
Even though he had been a judge only nine years to 
Holmes's thirty-five, Hand had an advantage because he had 
written a district court opinion on the constitutional issue3 - no 
such case had yet presented itself to the High Court for deci-
sion-and writing, of course, is the most rigorous form of think-
ing. Hand was emboldened by the rapport of their shared train 
compartment to pursue Holmes further in letters. Going back 
* B.S. 1974, Florida State University; J.D. 1977, University of Florida; James 
Madison Chair in Constitutional Law & Director of the Constitutional Law Center, 
Drake University Law School; thomas.baker@drake.edu. 
1. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Sir Frederick Pollock (Aug. 21, 
1919), in Mark DeWolfe Howe, ed., 2 Holmes-Pollock Letters 22 (Belknap Press, 1961). 
2. See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amend-
mefl( Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 719,732 (1975). 
3. Masses Pub. Co. 11. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N. Y. 1917). 
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and forth several times, each elaborating on his argument with 
the smell of the lamp, Holmes tried to understand their differ-
ences and Hand tried to persuade him that their differences mat-
tered greatly. Hand's persistence coincided with a back channel 
campaign of several of Holmes's salon friends who urged on him 
a more progressive attitude toward dissident speech. It was a 
brave challenge to beard the lion of the law, but they succeeded. 
Their arguments were magnified through Holmes's intense in-
tellect, and focused on a then-undeveloped area of constitutional 
law. Holmes became a judicial champion of the rights of con-
science. Modern constitutionalists continue to teach his opinions 
as part of the canon. 
Historians and biographers have carefully chronicled how 
Holmes came to be persuaded to wrap his great mind around the 
First Amendment and how his thinking and insights eventually 
became part of the warp and woof of modern free speech doc-
trine.4 But let us suppose an alternative sequence of events. 
Suppose that chance meeting did not take place. Suppose 
Holmes was not feeling up to traveling that morning and simply 
decided to postpone his trip until the next day. After all, he was 
77 years old and, though he enjoyed reasonably good health, he 
did suffer from intestinal problems from a Civil War bout with 
dysentery. How would constitutional law be different if Hand 
had taken the Wednesday train and Holmes had taken the 
Thursday train, each to ride alone with his thoughts, never the 
two minds to meet? 
Without that affirming conversation on the train and the 
validation of the follow-up correspondence, Hand might have 
been too timid to take on Holmes in an ego-to-ego fight over 
something so important. Holmes was his hero, after all. Hand 
was plagued by deep self-doubts all his life, even after he 
achieved great stature as a jurist. Furthermore, Hand had been 
reversed rather unceremoniously by his immediate superiors on 
the Second Circuie in the very case he was urging on the Justice, 
and his opinion had gone largely ignored. 
Without the worshipful influence of his judicial protege, 
Holmes might have been sufficiently cocksure to resist the en-
treaties of his academic friends. He had a rather low opinion of 
4. See generally Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand: The Man and the Judge 151-70 
(Knopf, 1994); G. Edward White, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: Law and the Inner Self 
412-54 (Oxford U. Press, 1993). 
5. Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917}. 
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legal scholarship. He had long taken a crabbed view of claims of 
self-expression, both on the Supreme Court of Massachusetts6 
and on the Supreme Court of the United States.7 His prelimi-
nary views on the First Amendment might have been preserved 
intact and whole, like an ant in amber, fossilized for all time. We 
might imagine what the evolutionary record of the First 
Amendment might read like without Holmes's personal trans-
formation and, in turn, without the transformative influence he 
wrought on the Supreme Court. Consider some possibilities. 
Holmes's greatest First Amendment opinion would be 
Schenck v. United States.8 Generations of professors and stu-
dents still would parse the quotation, "The most stringent pro-
tection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shout-
ing fire in a theatre and causing a panic," emphasizing the telling 
adverb "falsely."9 But Holmes and a unanimous Court sided 
with the government to affirm the defendants' convictions for 
mailing leaflets which asserted that conscription violated the 
Constitution. The speech was not protected because it created 
"a clear and present danger" of hindering the government's war 
effort, something "Congress has a right to prevent. "10 
Holmes's untransformed approach is further illustrated in 
two actual cases applying his clear and present danger test. In 
Debs v. United States11 he wrote to affirm the conviction of 
Eugene Debs, a prominent Socialist, for allegedly encouraging 
others to obstruct military recruiting. In Frohwerk v. United 
States 12 he wrote again to affirm the conviction of a newspaper 
publisher for articles urging resistance to the draft. If this were 
still the law decades later, the government could have sent 
Geor9e McGovern to prison for his opposition to the Vietnam 
War. 1 
6. McAuliffe v. Mayor of City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517,517 (1892) ("The peti-
tioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to 
be a policeman."). 
7. Pauerson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454,462 (1907) ("The preliminary freedom ex-
tends as well to the false as to the true; the subsequent punishment may extend as well to 
the true as to the false."). 
8. 249 u.s. 47 (1919). 
9. !d. at 52. 
10. ld. 
11. 249U.S.211 (1919). 
12. 249 U.S. 204 (1919). 
13. Harry Kalven, Jr., Professor Ernst Freund and Debs v. United States, 40 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 235,237 (1973). 
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Holmes would not have written his great dissent in Abrams 
v. United States. 14 We would thus lack the "marketplace of 
ideas" metaphor. One of the basic tenets of free speech theory 
would be missing: the fundamental principle that the govern-
ment cannot suppress ideas because "the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market. "15 Instead, we might have the Holmesian quotation 
"free speech stands no differently than freedom from vaccina-
tion."16 
Likewise, Holmes would not have written his classic dissent 
in Gitlow v. New York17 and he would not have joined Justice 
Brandeis's signal concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 18 
thus maintaining the momentum of the clear and present danger 
test on the side of the government against dissidents. Conse-
quently, a lot of the strongest First Amendment ideas we take 
for granted simply would be lost. Perhaps someone else would 
have come up with it, but it would not have come from Holmes. 
Looking at the two leading Cold War decisions-Dennis19 
and Yates20 -we can conclude that Chief Justice Vinson's opin-
ion in Dennis is more in harmony with the pre-transformation 
Holmes while Justice Harlan's opinion in Yates relies on the 
post-transformation Holmes who never came into being. Thus, 
advocacy of the abstract doctrine of the forcible overthrow of 
the government would be no more protected than actually in-
citing a violent revolution. If Communists have no First 
Amendment protection from government suppression and 
prosecution, then Congress could have its way with them and 
with every other organization deemed to be a threat to the good 
order. 
The original clear and present danger test would have been 
satisfied on the uncomfortable facts in Brandenburg v. Ohio.21 
So the underlying conviction would have been affirmed and 
there would have been no occasion for the majority to expand 
the language of the test to make it more protective of free 
14. 250 U.S. 616,624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
15. Id. at 630. 
16. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Learned Hand, reprinted in Gun-
ther, 27 Stan. L. Rev. at 757 (cited in note 2). See Jacobson v. Massachuserrs, 197 U.S. 11 
(1905). 
17. 268 U.S. 652,672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
18. 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
19. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
20. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). 
21. 395 u.s. 444 (1969). 
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speech. Whitney v. Califomia22 would still be on the books. 
States could disband Ku Klux Klan rallies and punish the mere 
advocacy of Klan doctrine under syndicalism statutes. State offi-
cials later would not resist the temptation to exercise that same 
power over other dissident minority groups, in the defense of 
Southern apartheid. Racial protests, disturbances, and riots 
might have triggered an era of American pogroms subject only 
to the kind of governmental self-restraint exhibited during the 
Palmer Raids. 
The Vietnam protest cases would have been decided under 
a different dynamic, one far more favorable to the government. 
The Holmes of the Schenck opinion would have had an easy 
time sending Hess-and others of his ilk- to prison for yelling to 
the mob "We'll take the fucking street later!"23 He would not 
have seen that statement as "counsel for present moderation" 
any more than falsely shouting fire was an invitation to go out-
side for a smoke.24 
"Fighting words" are "a retail version of the kind of speech 
that, if engaged in on the wholesale level," amounts to a clear 
and present danger.25 R.A. V. v. City of St. Pauf6 would thus have 
been decided differently. Burning a cross in the yard of the only 
African-American family in the neighborhood creates clear and 
present dangers of a breach of the peace and violation of civil 
rights. And it is only a small step from upholding that ordinance 
to upholding more and more expansive speech codes that would 
criminalize all harms of offending another person based on race, 
color, creed, gender, or sexual orientation. 
The greater-power-includes-the-lesser power syllogism in 
Schenck-that if Congress can punish obstruction of the draft 
then it can punish speech that may obstruct the draft-might 
have significantly influenced the doctrine of commercial speech. 
Justice Rehnquist could have cited Holmes for his 1986 dictum 
that the greater power to ban casino gambling includes the lesser 
power to ban advertising.27 If this proposition held, then the 
commercial speech doctrine would have been circumscribed to 
22. 274 u.s. 357 (1927). 
23. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973). 
24. Id. at 108; id. at 109-12 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
25. John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 1111 (5th ed. 
1995). 
26. 505 u.s. 377 (1992). 
27. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 
(1986). 
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protect only advertisements for constitutionally-protected inter-
ests such as birth control and abortion.28 Thus, the shadow of 
Holmes-untransformed would be cast into the millennium of the 
Internet to endorse government regulation by enforced igno-
rance in the marketplace of goods and services. 
Justice Holmes's personal legacy and reputation would have 
been substantially lessened if he had not been inspired to enlist 
in the defense of freedom to dissent. More important, the 
United States would be a politically poorer country, after four 
generations of the government quelling the people into political 
imbecility. Offering an answer to Holmes's rhetorical question, 
therefore, we can speculate that it was very important to our 
world of ideas that the grand old man's bowels allowed him to 
ride the train that Wednesday morning. 
28. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Inti., 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Bigelow v. Vir-
ginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
